X. Álvarez, M. Gómez-Rúa, J. Vidal-Puga
Protection against flooding is becoming increasingly difficult for economic and hydrological reasons. Reducing such risks through water retention throughout the basin is an alternative solution. For this purpose, land owners should be encouraged to use their land in a way that improves its water retention capacity. However, problems of fairness may arise because a landowner can benefit or lose out depending on the use of other lands. This paper sets out to study the possibility of applying game theory through a cooperative game to solve this problem. Specifically, we look for a sharing rule function to help the planners to distribute the total benefit among landowners, taking into account a principle of stability. We demonstrate that it is possible to establish distribution rules that encourage stable compensation among landowners and that game theory can therefore be used to establish a cost/benefit criterion in flood risk management.
Keywords: game theory, land management, flood mitigation, land use, compensations, decision-making
Scheduled
GT2-1 MA-1 Game Theory. Tribute to Marco Antonio López
September 5, 2019 10:40 AM
I3L8. Georgina Blanes building