E. Algaba, S. Béal, E. Rémila, P. Solal
This talk deals with Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. In particular, we focus on the set of winning coalitions derived from a voting game. This framework allows for analyzing new and real situations, in which there exists a feedback between the economic influence of each coalition of agents and its political power. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Harsanyi power solutions on the subclass of union stable systems arisen from the winning coalitions from a voting game when the influence is determined by a power index. Moreover, a new characterization for the Harsanyi power solutions on the whole class of union stable systems is provided and, as a consequence, a characterization of the Myerson value is obtained when the equal power measure is considered.
Keywords: TU-game, Harsanyi power solutions, Shapley value
Scheduled
GT2-1 MA-1 Game Theory. Tribute to Marco Antonio López
September 5, 2019 10:40 AM
I3L8. Georgina Blanes building