G. Bergantiños Cid, J. D. Moreno-Ternero

We consider the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport league events, introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). We characterize a family of rules compromising between two focal and somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. The characterization only makes use of three basic axioms: equal treatment of equals, additivity and maximum aspirations. We also show further interesting features of the family: (i) if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then a majority voting equilibrium exists; (ii) the rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance criterion; (iii) the family provides rationale for existing schemes in real-life situations.

Keywords: cooperative games, allocation rules

Scheduled

GT2-2 MA-2 Game Theory. Tribute to Marco Antonio López
September 5, 2019  12:00 PM
I3L8. Georgina Blanes building


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Problemas de reclamación con paquetes indivisibles de diferentes tamaños

M. T. Estañ Pereña, N. Llorca Pascual, R. Martínez Rico, J. Sánchez Soriano

Sobre el nucleolo de juegos cooperativos con muchos jugadores

J. Puerto Albandoz, F. Perea Rojas-Marcos

Valores igualitarios para juegos con uniones a priori

J. M. Alonso Meijide, J. Costa Bouzas, I. García Jurado, J. C. Gonçalves

How allocating the costs of cooperation with pairwise reduction

A. J. Mayor Serra, A. Meca, J. García Martínez


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