A family of rules to share the revenues from broadcasting sport events

G. Bergantiños Cid, J. D. Moreno-Ternero

We consider the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport league events, introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). We characterize a family of rules compromising between two focal and somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. The characterization only makes use of three basic axioms: equal treatment of equals, additivity and maximum aspirations. We also show further interesting features of the family: (i) if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then a majority voting equilibrium exists; (ii) the rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance criterion; (iii) the family provides rationale for existing schemes in real-life situations.

Keywords: cooperative games allocation rules

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