A. J. Mayor Serra, A. Meca, J. García Martínez
We consider a cooperation model, with a priori information, in which agents agree to coordinate their actions to individually reducing their costs as consequence of sharing resources. It is a bilateral interaction of multiple and independent partners that act in pairs in such a way that the cost reductions are coalitionally independent, which means that the cost each agent reduces to another agent does not depend on the others, remaining constant in any possible coalition.
We define the associated cost game as the one that measures the cost of each coalition in a linear way according to the costs of each member of the coalition. We call them monotonic linear games with pairwise cost reduction. We prove that it is profitable for the agents in this game to form the grand coalition to obtain a significant reduction in costs; i.e. monotonic linear games with pairwise cost reduction are concave. Then, we propose the Shapley value as a stable and easy-to-calculate cost allocation.
Palabras clave: Shapley Value, Cooperation,, bilateral, monotonic linear games, pairwise cost reduction
Programado
GT2-2 MA-2 Teoría de Juegos. Homenaje a Marco Antonio López
5 de septiembre de 2019 12:00
I3L8. Edificio Georgina Blanes